God saves sinners! (part 7)

The bondage of the will is not determinism

An objection to the doctrine of the bondage of the will stems from a misunderstanding of the terminology. Specifically, some might think that to make the claim that our wills are in bondage, and can only be inclined toward God by an act of supernatural grace, is to imply that we are mere automatons without any power to choose at all. But clearly, we’re able to make choices and then act according to them, right?

Free will and free agency

This objection fails to make the crucial distinction between free will, on the one hand, and free agency on the other. It is important to be clear that no one is saying that the fall has taken away our ability to make choices. That would be absurd since we obviously make them constantly—whom to marry, where to work, whether to have our eggs scrambled or over easy—obviously these sorts of choices are all well within our capacity. This ability to make choices in accordance with our desires is what we are calling free agency. Even after the fall, we are still free agents.

On the other hand, what Augustinians argue (the Reformed follow Augustine in this) is that the fall has taken away our freedom—in that it has taken away our desire and inclination—to choose what pleases God. It is this liberty to love and obey God that we are referring to as free will. Post-fall, we have retained our free agency, but we have lost our free will.

Free choices, motives, and self-determination

But if we have power to choose, how is it that we have no power to choose what pleases God? Is this a contradiction? In answering this question, it is first necessary to reflect on the nature of choice itself. Why do we choose certain things and not others? Do we really exercise perfect freedom when we choose? Or are our free choices determined by something else? This may seem paradoxical, but the fact of the matter is that our wills are not “neutral.” Our choices don’t come out of nowhere. Rather, when we choose, we do so on the basis of our motives and preferences. Our wills are guided and directed from within by factors that are not of our choosing.

An illustration may help. Suppose that someone places before you two plates. One of them contains your favorite food (let’s say prime rib). The other contains your least favorite (say fried okra). Now suppose you’re asked to choose between the two. Which plate do you choose? I guarantee, all other things being equal (e.g., no one is holding a gun to your head and threatening to pull the trigger if you eat the steak, and no one is offering you a free trip to Tahiti if you force down the okra), you will choose the prime rib every single time.

Are you able to choose the okra? Yes. Are you able to prefer the okra? No way! Try as you might, you cannot will your preferences to change. Your free choices are free, but they are at the same time (and without contradiction) the consequences of your preferences—preferences that you did not choose.

It is also important to notice that sometimes we find that we have preferences or motives that conflict with each other. For example, suppose someone is holding a gun to your head and threatening to shoot if you don't choose the okra. In this scenario, you would (I hope) choose to endure the okra and forego the steak because the strength of your motive to enjoy your favorite meal would pale by comparison with your powerful motivation to preserve your life!

In situations in which we have conflicting motives (most situations?), our free choices (yes, even with a gun to our head, we are still choosing freely since hypothetically we could choose the suicidal option if we wanted to) are determined by our strongest motive. As Jonathan Edwards concisely put it in his great treatise, The Freedom of the Will (which is perhaps the all-time classic work on this subject), "It is that motive, which, as it stands in view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will" (The Freedom of the Will 1.2). Our wills are determined by our motives.

However, as R.C. Sproul points out, this is not tantamount to determinism, because determinism says that our choices are compelled from outside of us. (Sproul’s helpful discussion in his book Chosen by God is derived from Edwards’ work.) Rather, it “is what we call self-determination, which is the essence of freedom” (Chosen by God, p. 54). Our free choices are self-determined on the basis of our motives and preferences, and this power of self-determination is the very essence of freedom.

Free agency and the bondage of the will

These same principles apply as we consider the question of how much freedom we have by nature to love and obey God. He created us in Adam with the desire to freely choose the things that please Him—that is to say, with pure motives and holy affections. In Adam’s fall we forfeited our inherent righteousness, and along with it our heart-inclination to please God. Sadly, our desires and affections are now self-centered and focused on the creature rather than the Creator. The ancient indictment is ever apropos: "[T]he LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great on the earth, and that every intent of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually" (Genesis 6:5; cf. Genesis 8:21). And it is this pervasive depravity of our hearts that determines the direction our free choices will take.

To be sure, we are still free agents because we retain the power and freedom to choose according to our desires. But our wills are in bondage in the sense that they are compelled to follow wherever our evil inclinations and motives lead. And try as we might, we have no power in and of ourselves to change our evil inclinations—any more than a leopard has power to change his spots. We are not compelled against our will. The bondage is from within, not from without.

Perhaps where the rubber meets the road with the greatest urgency concerning this issue of the bondage of the will is with respect to the question as to whether or not a sinner, apart from a work of divine grace, is able to trust in Christ for his salvation. Does a sinner have the power and freedom to respond to the call of the gospel?

R.C. Sproul responds to this query decisively in the negative, summing up the matter definitively on behalf of the Reformed tradition:

In order to choose Christ, the sinner must first have a desire to choose Christ. Either he has that desire already within him or he must receive that desire from God. Edwards and all who embrace the Reformed view of predestination agree that if God does not plant that desire in the human heart nobody, left to themselves, will ever freely choose Christ. They will always and everywhere reject the gospel precisely because they do not desire the gospel. They will always and everywhere reject Christ precisely because they do not desire Christ. They will freely reject Christ in the sense that they will act according to their desires (Chosen by God, pp. 61-62).

To sum up, the doctrine of the bondage of the will does not mean that we have lost the ability to make choices, nor does it mean that our choices are determined by forces outside of us. Rather, it means that we have lost the desire and motivation—and hence the ability—to incline our wills toward the things of God, even to the extent of lacking the power to repent and believe the gospel. When it comes to heavenly things, we are like bad trees that can do no other than bear bad fruit.

Now that we have dealt with a couple of common misconceptions (in this post and the last one), I’ll attempt in the next post to focus more specifically on what is entailed in the doctrine of total depravity.

(To be continued …)